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Regular reference is made, within the discourse around the South African
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, to the fact that ubuntu, an indigenous
world view, played a role in the process. This paper tries to show that despite
these references, important analysts of the TRC (as well as many South Afri-
cans) had insufficiently accounted for this worldview in their critical read-
ings of the Commission’s work and therefore found aspects of the process in-
coherent and/or morally and legally confused. I am not arguing that the TRC
was not a deeply flawed process, but want to establish how powerfully this
indigenous world view brought a coherency that not only enabled the TRC to
do its work without incidences of revenge, but imbued politically and legally
trapped concepts with new possibilities. The pervasiveness of this world
view within eg. the second round of TRC testimonies is noticeable and show
how often the critique on the TRC fails to take this dominant role into ac-
count and how many, seemingly contradictory or confusing, positions be-
come coherent when regarded within this worldview. This view of intercon-
nectedness, consistently expressed throughout the life of the commission, has
wide implications for the interpretation of healing, the asking of amnesty, the
rehabilitation of perpetrators, the interdependence of forgiveness and recon-
ciliation in the process of achieving full personhood within a healed society.
In the footsteps of Richard Bell, this paper locates this world view within a
particular framework formulated as ubuntu by Desmond Tutu, as communi-
tarianism by Kwame Gyekye, as ethnophilosophy by Paulin Hountondji etc.
The paper also tries to understand how this interconnected moral self is
formed and who the community could or should be that influences this moral
self.
Introduction
In his Nobel Prize speech (1986) Wole Soyinka expresses astonishment at how some
Africans seem able to forgive and reconcile enmity after much suffering and injustice.
He links it to their world view:
1 This paper was written during a fellowship at the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin 2007/2008.
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(T)here is a deep lesson for the world in the black races’ capacity to forgive,
one which, I often think, has much to do with the ethical percepts which spring
from their world view and authentic religions, none which is ever totally eradi-
cated by the accretions of foreign faiths and their implicit ethnocentrism. (Bell,
2002: p. 87)
Elsewhere Soyinka warns that: ‘(w)e should differentiate first of all between the delib-
erate use of Christian or Islamic symbolism, metaphors or historic archetypes,’ and the
application of ‘African indigenous values’ (Soyinka 1976: p.76).
According to Bloomfield, Barnes and Huyse, the South African TRC differed in
several important and useful ways from the previous (at least more than 15) Commis-
sions that investigated human rights abuses. I want to focus on only two of the ones
they mention as well as on one they don’t. The South African TRC was the first to in-
dividualize amnesty and to allow victims to testify in public. What, to my knowledge,
is not mentioned anywhere, is that it was also the first commission to allow people
from both sides of the conflict to testify at the same forum as victims. In this paper I
will argue that these differences, also described by Boraine and others as break-
throughs, were at least partly made possible by a particular cultural commonality. This
is not to say that political and other factors did not play an important role in the transi-
tion, but the peaceful acceptance of the specific work of the TRC by the black commu-
nity (whether as victims or perpetrators, e.g. more black perpetrators asked amnesty
than whites) as well as the way in which concepts such as amnesty, reconciliation and
forgiveness were innovatively used and understood, is indicative of something broader
and deeper than some of the TRC critics would allow. Although they mention the
word ubuntu, it plays hardly a role in the formulation of their critique. I will return to
the criticism later, but two examples are in order:
Probably the most often quoted analyst of the TRC, Richard Wilson, regards ubuntu
as mere ‘wrapping’ for an ANC agenda out to use the TRC to legitimize a new gov-
ernment.
Ubuntu should be recognized for what it is: an ideological concept with multi-
ple meanings which conjoins human rights, restorative justice, reconciliation
and nation-building within the populist language of pan-Africanism. In post-
apartheid South Africa, it became the Africanist wrapping used to sell a recon-
ciliatory version of human rights talk to black South Africans.(Wilson 2001:
p.13)
In her published thesis on forgiveness at the TRC, Annelies Verdoolaege regards
ubuntu as part of a ‘political agenda’ in a nation-building project (Verdoolaege 2005:
p. 403).
In short, most critics saw the world view of ubuntu as superficial and confusing, as
agenda and ideology, used by the powerful to present political, legal and/or personal
religious agendas in palatable form to more or less unsuspecting people. I want to ar-
gue that it was the other way round: the world view was the essence and foundation of
the TRC process, but it only became visible to some via the wrapping of Christianity
and restorative justice. In this essay I want to adhere to the call of Kwame Gyekye that
‘issues and problems unleashed by cultural and historical situations’ should be re-
sponded to on a conceptual level’ (Gyekye 1997: p. 34).
Clarifications
There is tension between those who claim the word ‘philosophy’ for ‘higher’ argu-
ments and those who feel that philosophy, worldview, ethos and cosmology overlap in
many areas. I prefer to use the term worldview (and not believe structures or social
imaginings) in the sense of ‘a particular system of values, beliefs and attitudes held by
a specific group’. (Rapport 2000: p. 395) Of course, the term worldview has its own
baggage, but to define and develop the appropriate terminology for this kind of analy-
sis in the space of an essay is highly problematic, especially when one is reminded of
further contestations around words such as African, Pan African, Sub-Sahara African
etc. Similarly, the over-use and exploitation of the word ubuntu makes it nearly
unusuable as well.
Aware therefore of the risks of ‘ethnophilosophy’ (Hountondji, 1983: p. 39) in tak-
ing the route of theoretically understanding something that is so abundantly and perva-
sively present, yet still so grappling-ly and tentatively theorized, I prefer in this essay
to use the term ‘interconnectedness-towards-wholeness’ and place it firmly within the
well defined and formulated broader African communitarianism as well as the more
Southern African localized term of ubuntu.
Interconnectedness-towards-wholeness in this essay is more than just a theoretical
knowledge that all things in the world are linked, it means both a mental and physical
awareness that one can only ‘become’ who one is, or could be, through the fullness of
that which is around one – both physical and metaphysical.
Wholeness is thus not a passive state of nirvana, but a process of becoming in which
everybody and everything is moving towards its fullest self, building itself; one can
only reach that fullest self though, through and with others which include ancestors
and universe.
Finally, the words forgiveness and reconciliation are used in this essay within the
concept of interconnectedness-towards-wholeness. Much has been written about the
difference between forgiveness (letting go, personally, of resentment and the past,)
and reconciliation (mutual commitment to an improved ethical future). In their re-
search on these concepts in Rwanda, Staub, Pearlman, Gubin and Hagengimana de-
fined forgiveness as presenting a change in the harmed party, while reconciliation a
change in both parties:
Forgiving involves letting go of anger and the desire for revenge. It can help in
diminishing the pain that results from victimization and in moving away from
an identity as a victim. … Since the definition of forgiving usually includes the
development of a more positive attitude toward the other (McCullough,
Fincham,& Tsang, 2003), reconciliation and forgiveness are clearly connected.
We define reconciliation as mutual acceptance by members of formerly hostile
groups of each other. Such acceptance includes positive attitudes, but also posi-
tive actions that express them, as circumstances allow and require. (Staub,
Pearlman, Gubin and Hagengimana 2005)
In the research quoted above, as well as research on the conflict in Ireland, (see eg
Collective guilt: International perspectives (2004) pp. 193-215) all discuss the possi-
bility of forgiveness without reconciliation, or of reconciliation without forgiveness.
However, within the concept interconnectedness-towards-wholeness, the notions of
forgiveness and reconciliation cannot be separated. They are not only closely linked,
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but also mutually dependent: the one begins, or opens up a process of becoming, while
the other is the crucial next step into this becoming. As the TRC testimonies and texts
will show, within the world view of interconnectedness-towards-wholeness, in order
to grow into one’s fullest self, one’s fullest potential personhood, the deed of asking
for forgiveness and forgiveness itself, needs to lead to recovery, reconciliation and
eventually to a fuller personhood.
It is important to remember that the Xhosa word for reconciliation in the concept
Truth and Reconciliation, is forgiveness (uxolelwano). The TRC literally means in
Xhosa: the Truth and Forgiveness Commission. When looked at from a human rights
view, one could say that forgiveness was forced on people through this name. When
looked at from an interconnected view, the word indicates the first step towards
changing into a more humane self that would include both victim and perpetrator.
I will use the testimonies of the second week of TRC hearings as well as some other
TRC texts to indicate the unobtrusive traces of interconnectedness in the TRC hearings
and how awareness of them contribute to a powerfully coherent, yet often unnoticed,
logic. The focus is also on the participants in the process and not only on those who
set up and ran the Commission.
Formulations of forgiveness and reconciliation during the TRC
The most coherent and deeply understood sense of interconnectedness related to for-
giveness that I know, had been articulated by one of the Gugulethu Seven mothers,
Cynthia Ngewu, during the second week of TRC human rights violation hearings.
Mrs Ngewu ‘s son, Christopher Piet formed part of a group of seven young men,
lured by askaris (guerillas who secretly changed loyalties and spied for the South Afri-
can Police Force) to receive military training inside the country, in order to join
Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), the military wing of the African National Congress
(ANC). During their first mission all seven of them were ambushed and killed by se-
curity police early on the morning of 3 March 1986. Eyewitnesses from a nearby hos-
tel testified that some of the young men came out of the bushes with their hands in the
air and that Russian hand grenades and guns were placed on their dead bodies. A tele-
vision news crew of the state broadcaster, the SABC, was called to document the kill-
ing of ‘terrorists’. A police video was also made. (See TRC Report Volume 3, p. 451).
This incident became known as the Gugulethu Seven.
One of the black perpetrators, the askari Mbele, requested a private meeting with the
Gugulethu mothers in order to ask forgiveness. Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela, committee
member of the TRC, oversaw the meeting between the killer and the mothers of those
who died. The following translated quote of Mrs Ngewu given after the meeting, was
afterwards broadcasted on SABC radio.
This thing called reconciliation ...if I am understanding it correctly ... if it
means this perpetrator, this man who has killed Christopher Piet, if it means he
becomes human again, this man, so that I, so that all of us, get our humanity
back ... then I agree, then I support it all. (Krog 1998: p.109)
In simple terms Cynthia Ngewu spells out the full complex implications of being inter-
connected-towards-wholeness and the role of reconciliation in it.
Her words, firstly, mean that she understood that the killer of her child could, and
did, kill because he had lost his humanity; he was no longer human. Secondly, she un-
derstood that to forgive him would open up the possibility for him to regain his hu-
manity; to change profoundly. Thirdly, she understood also that the loss of her son af-
fected her own humanity; she herself had now an affected humanity. Fourthly and
most importantly, she understood that if indeed the perpetrator felt himself driven by
her forgiveness to regain his humanity, then it would open up for her the possibility to
become fully human again.
This is a remarkable formulation! It affirms how somebody, who would be regarded
by many as not effectively literate, let alone schooled in African philosophy, inti-
mately understood her interconnectedness and could formulate it succinctly. Together
with the formulations of the Commissioners themselves, especially the chairperson,
Mrs Ngewu’s words throw off the imposed paradigm in a way that Tsenay Sereque-
berhan describes as ‘an antidote to colonialism (Serequeberhan 1994: p. 84, p. 91). I
argue that it is precisely this understanding and knowledge of inter-connectedness-to-
wards-wholeness that underpinned most of the testimonies delivered before the TRC
and was largely responsible for the absence of revenge and the way anger was
articulated.
(To put it more bluntly, the daily living of interconnectedness, and not simply Chris-
tianity, was the determining factor both in ‘making the TRC work’ and the tone of the
hearings.)
But what is the difference between forgiveness inspired by Christ and forgiveness
inspired by interconnectedness-towards-wholeness?
Christian forgiveness says: I forgive you, because Jesus has forgiven me (Forgive us
our trespasses as we forgive those who trespassed against us). The reward of this for-
giveness will be in heaven and also holds the possibility that one can forgive without
reconciling. (Indeed General Tienie Groenewald, who refused to appear before the
TRC, said in a radio interview: ‘This is between God and myself. I have nothing to say
to Tutu’ (Krog, 1998: p.17)). Furthermore, Christian forgiveness also has the possibil-
ity of reconciling without forgiving: one can live in peace with sinful neighbours
without forgiving them their deeds.
On the other hand, interconnected forgiveness says: I forgive you so that you can
change/heal here on earth, then I can start on my interconnected path towards healing.
The effort is towards achieving full personhood on earth. This means that forgiveness
can never be without the next step: reconciliation, and reconciliation can not take place
without it fundamentally changing the life of the one that forgave as well as the for-
given one. Although it allows for the perpetrator to ask for forgiveness (and in fact
prefers the perpetrator’s quest for forgiveness to be the beginning of the process), it
also allows for the possibility of the victim to move towards wholeness without the
perpetrator asking for forgiveness – in other words, the victim may forgive without
even being asked and thus the power towards wholeness stays firmly in the hands of
the victim. After the act of forgiveness, however, the perpetrator must change.
(Tutu’s response to Groenewald’s refusal to ask for forgiveness of people, befits in-
terconnectedness: ‘If you beat your wife, you can’t simply say this is between me and
God. You also have to go to your wife and say: I’m sorry.’)
Another example of how interconnectedness informed forgiveness, came from the
rev Frank Chikane. After the trial of apartheid chemical warfare expert Wouter
Basson, Chikane, as one of his victims, said that he had forgiven his tormentors, but
‘until the perpetrator says ‘I’m sorry’ and want to change and lead a different life, he
becomes a prisoner for ever, even if I have forgiven him. So my forgiveness does not
liberate the perpetrator’(Brand, 2002: p. 90). In other words, the circle of forgiveness
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can only be concluded when the perpetrator tries to restore his own wholeness (want
to change) and through that restores the wholeness of society (actively contributing to
produce a better society).
When on 3 Aug 2006, former Minister of Police, Adriaan Vlok, in an act of asking
forgiveness, derided by many, washed the feet of rev Frank Chikane, the latter re-
sponded as follows: ‘I shared it with the congregation and people just broke down and
cried. And there is no way that you can have that experience and keep it quiet.’
TRC testimonial responses to forgiveness
During its first round of hearings through the country, the TRC held a four day hearing
(22 – 25 April 1996) in Cape Town. A total of 44 testimonies focusing on 25 cases
were heard over four days, focusing on some important and well known names such as
Anton Fransch and Anton Lubowski, well known massacres like those of Gugulethu
and the St James Church, as well as incidences of violence committed during the infa-
mous years of 1976 and 1986.
Although it was only the second week of hearings, the accumulative effect of listen-
ing to the human rights violations was already beginning to exact its toll from the
Commissioners and staff. Both Archbishop Tutu (East London) and Mary Burton
(Cape Town) had broken down in public and first attempts were made to council
Commissioners and staff.
Being only too aware of the slippages in simultaneous interpretation and how diffi-
cult it is for philosophical concepts to survive the crossing from one language to an-
other which does not share the same culture, the following observations could be made
from the English transcriptions of testimonies delivered during the second week of
hearings in Cape Town:
Not once in any of the Xhosa and Tswana testimonies was Christ mentioned in
terms of forgiveness. This could indicate that the ‘reason’ to forgive (Derrida’s
miracle) was not located in Christ, but was found elsewhere. (In contrast to
this, the coloured victims as well as their white minister explicitly said that they
had forgiven the perpetrators, because Jesus had forgiven them.)
At least nine direct references were made to interconnectedness: four by Chairperson
Tutu, two by Commissioner Ntsebeza and three by victims.
The direct references to interconnectedness by the Truth Commissioners focused on
the sharing of pain and loss:
(a) …we need to keep reminding ourselves we do belong in one family. And to help
those who lost their humanity to recover their old (Chairperson Tutu to
Kwisomba family)
(b) This is not just your pain only, it is shared by all of us (Tutu to Ms Gishi)
(c) Your wound is ours too (Commissioner Ntsebeza to Juqu family)
The idea here is not to classify these expressions as uniquely ubuntu-ean in content,
but to warn that they should also not be read as mere expressions of people misled or
pressurized or confused into kindness, because within a particular ‘social imagining’
they could well be signifiers of a hitherto unnoticed worldview. Note further that, al-
though these may sound like common and ordinary sentences, Alex Boraine, in his
very kind welcoming words, never makes this kind of interconnected claim – also not
to white victims. (I would certainly have found it difficult to believe if he said that Mrs
Ngewu’s pain was also his (Boraine’s) pain. But I realize that I also would have had
the same difficulty if he said that Mrs Lubowski’s pain was his pain – but when Tutu
and Ntsebeza shared the pain of black and white, I believed that.)
(d) Nomatise, now I am going to speak Xhosa with you, I am going to ask you to
please bear with me, your pain is our pain as well (Ntsebeza to Mrs Tsobileyo)
Tutu makes two references to the healing that forgiveness will bring through sharing:
… thank you very much my sister, please have forgiveness in you. We hope
that you will be healed spiritually and physically thank you (Tutu to Ms
Tsobileyo)
Thank you for your spirit of forgiveness which joins the spirit of forgiveness of so
many others (Tutu to Bishop Retief)
While the Commissioners emphasized the interconnectedness of pain; the victims
underlined the break-down in interconnectedness, but often suggesting at the same
time how it could be healed. Especially Mrs Ngewu and Mr Maliti were articulating
the need of victims to grant forgiveness in order to re-humanise themselves:
…we still have this big lump in our throats. If - if they can be put here in front
of us maybe that lump can go away. (Mrs Ngewu in the Gugulethu Seven case)
‘Nobody even bothered to ask for forgiveness. When we saw each other, they
just looked down.’ (Mr Maliti in the Delato case)
(If) the Truth Commission (can) assist in the education of that boy, as well as
accommodation of that boy. Because in the old end, he is got to contribute
maybe to peace - towards peace in this country, he will have felt the pain, and
he will have felt maybe how to forgive, thank you (Mr Kama in the Mzimkulu
Johnson case)
The quotations above show that these remarks of interconnectedness were made in the
African language mother tongues, by educated and uneducated people alike.
Restoring wholeness in psychology
The need to restore wholeness is also articulated in the work of psychologist Pumla
Gobodo-Madikizela. In her book A Human Being died that Night she finds the
post-holocaust notion that it is impossible to forgive the unforgivable ‘unhelpful’.
She wants forgiveness as a normalising factor ‘(T)o say that some evil deeds are
simply unforgivable, does not capture the richness and complexity of all the social
contexts within which gross evil is committed’ (Gobodo-Madikizela 2003: p.124). She
insists that ‘philosophical questions can and should give way and be subsumed to hu-
man questions, for in the end we are a society of people and not of ideas, a fragile web
of interdependent humans, not of stances’ (my italics).
Gobodo-Madikizela gives several reasons why a victim would want to interact in a
non-revengeful way with those who violated his or her rights.
We are induced to empathy because there is something in the other that is felt
to be part of the self, and something in the self that is felt to belong to the other.
The victim needs forgiveness as part of the process of becoming rehumanized.
The victim needs it in order to complete himself and wrest away from the per-
petrator the fiat power to destroy. Far from being an unnerving proposition and
a burdensome moral sacrifice, compassion, for many, is deeply therapeutic and
restorative. (Gobodo-Madikizela 2003: p. 127 - 132)
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The victim now becomes the gate keeper to what the outcast desires: namely re-
admission into the human community. Forgiveness or salvation does not over-
look the deed, but rises above it. ‘This is what it means to be human,’ it says. ‘I
cannot and will not return the evil you inflicted on me,’ and that is the victim’s
triumph. (Gobodo-Madikizela 2003: p.117)
Interconnectedness-towards-wholeness as part of a
communitarian African world view
The importance of interconnectedness had been stressed many times by African phi-
losophers (Gyekye, Hountondji, Wiredu) , theologians (Setiloane, Tutu, Tempels), so-
ciologists (Gobodo-Madikizela, Ratele) etc., but seemed often to fall on deaf western
scholarly ears when it comes to using it in analysis and assessment.
Thus, ubuntu or interconnectedness is not an isolated exceptional phenomenon, but
part of a much broader, more general context found in a variety of forms, under a vari-
ety of names, manifesting in a variety of cultures across the large African continent. In
his famous essay on African Philosophical thought, Kwame Gyekye says that
communitarism is being held by most of the scholarship involving cultures of Africa,
as the most outstanding trademark as well as the most defining characteristic. He
quotes Kwesi Dickson’s somewhat essentialist remark that this sense of community is
a ‘characteristic of African life to which attention had been drawn again and again by
both African and non-African writers on Africa. Indeed, to many this characteristic
defines Africanness’ (Gyekye 1997: p.36).
Ifeanyi Menkiti also maintains that ‘as far as Africans are concerned, the reality of
the communal world takes precedence over the reality of the individual life histories’
and therefore comes to three conclusions: the community defines the individual;
personhood is not bestowed on somebody simply through birth, but is something to be
acquired; personhood is something at which an individual could fail (Gyekye 1997: p.
37).
Gyekye states that communitarian logic ‘assumes a great concern for communal val-
ues, for the good of the wider society as such. … (it) deeply cherishes the social values
of peace, harmony, stability, solidarity and mutual reciprocities and sympathy’ (Gykye
1997: p. 65).
He says that the basis of a caring society need not be religious:
It is also possible to derive a conception of human dignity … not from theism
but from reflections on human nature, particularly on the qualities that will dis-
pose the human being to function at his best in human society and realize his
potentials to the full. (Gyekye 1997: p.63)
He makes a stern distinction between being driven by ‘caring or compassion or gener-
osity’ rather than justice (Gyekye 1997: p. 70).
If one were to look for a pervasive and fundamental concept in African socio-
ethical thought generally – a concept that animates other intellectual activities
and forms of behaviour, including religious behaviour, and provides continuity,
resilience, nourishment, and meaning to life – that concept would most proba-
bly be humanism: a philosophy that sees human needs, interests, and dignity as
of fundamental importance and concern.
Taking this interconnectedness, from which a person ‘builds’ himself into a caring be-
ing, as a basis, the South African theologian, Gabriel Setiloane, in his seminal work on
the image of God among the Sotho-Tswana, suggests that Christianity became embed-
ded within this communitarian spirituality: ‘… while passing all the orthodox criteria
to make it ‘Christian’ (it) is nevertheless understood within the assumptions of the
mekgwa ya bo-rra rona’ (customs, beliefs and ways of life) (Setiloane 1976: p.161).
In other words, Christianity (or human rights, restorative justice, or for that matter
the theology of Tutu, the politics of Mandela) is not simply linked to, or a (pagan)
add-on to interconnectedness, but is in fact imbedded therein, it forms the interpretive
foundation of it. It is this foundation that enabled people to re-interpret western con-
cepts such as forgiveness, reconciliation, amnesty, justice etc in a new and useable
way.
In other words: these concepts moved across cultural borders and were infused and
energized by a sense of interconnectedness-towards-wholeness. Setiloane stresses that
the Sotho-Tswana ‘has taken over Christian concepts and understandings and moulded
them anew giving them an interpretation more reminiscent of their traditional practice’
(Setiloane 1976: p.185).
In his book on African Philosophy, Richard Bell deals extensively with moderate
communalism and describes ubuntu as a notion rooted in ‘whatever form of commu-
nalism that may have survived in South Africa.’ He quotes Alex Boraine who de-
scribed ubuntu as an ancient Philosophy that gave rise to a need ‘for a more commu-
nity-orientated jurisprudence that acknowledges the reality that individuals are part of
a much larger social context’ (Bell 2002: p. 89).
After the Rwandan genocide Tutu noted that it was clearly not a mechanical and in-
evitable process to know that one has to build oneself into a good person through car-
ing for others. Not to know that, however, could be regarded ‘as a moral deficiency’
(Bell 2002: p. 89).
This pervasive world view throws a different light on some of the remarks about the
failures of the TRC.
When Mahmood Mamdani asks: if ‘truth has replaced justice in South Africa – has
reconciliation then turned into an embrace of evil?’ (Krog 1998: p. 112; see also
Mamdani’s ‘Reconciliation without Justice’), he ignores a world view that suggests
that embracing the evil-one could be the beginning of a humanizing process in which
compassion and change brings the ultimate form of justice. The fact that only a few
perpetrators became scapegoats and that land reparations were not properly addressed
during the TRC process, only becomes deeply problematic within a human rights and
western post second world war milieu, but within a communitarian world view, one
could have assumed that everybody would feel themselves interconnected with the
scapegoats and that amnesty would therefore be the start of a process of change into
reparation involving everybody. That it did not happen is more an indication of a dom-
inating non-interconnecting culture clashing with an indigenous one, than a moral fail-
ure or confusion of those involved in the TRC process from a grassroots level. (Even
the TRC legislation itself could imagine no reciprocal connection between amnesty
seeker and victim.)
Maybe even Derrida would not have regarded it as a ‘confusion’ on Tutu’s part ‘to
oscillate between a non-penal and non-reparative logic of ‘forgiveness’ (he calls it ‘re-
storative’) and a judicial logic of amnesty’. (Derrida 2001: p. 32) Tutu was not simply
linking human rights and amnesty to religion, but was using the foundation of inter-
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connectedness to allow people back into humanity through processes such as forgive-
ness and amnesty.
Amnesty, as a process of admitting a wrong and wanting it to be set aside, fits in
neatly with the victims’ desire to rebuild a humane and caring community. The fact
that many, mostly white and western people, did not read amnesty in that way and pre-
ferred to see it as being ‘let off the hook’ , is to be laid rather at the feet of Christianity
and human rights, in stead of suggesting an indigenous confusion.
Within a communitarian framework the term ‘religious-redemptive ethos’ (Wilson
2001: p.109) is also out of place, as well as the suggestion that the TRC was used to
politically legitimize the new ANC government (Wilson, Verdoolaege). It was the
knowledge among ordinary people, attending and participating in the TRC process in
their thousands, of the possibility that one could only fully ‘build’ oneself within a car-
ing reconciled community, which drove the process rather than any political agenda or
pact between the new elites (Van Binsbergen 2001). The Commission did not neces-
sarily have a ‘dual consciousness’ with practical justice and forgiveness on the one
hand and a confused understanding of human rights on the other (Wilson 2001:
p.153). It was talking from a sense of interconnectedness which lit up concepts like
justice, amnesty, forgiveness, reconciliation and human rights in a particular new and I
would suggest very coherent way.
When Annelies Verdoolaege notes that the ruling ANC party is using the TRC and
reconciliation as a nation building exercise, she is ignoring the possibility that many of
the forty million not-white South Africans could be interested in restoring a trauma-
tized community through affirming its interconnectedness towards wholeness which
would entail equal sharing of resources.
The South African TRC is credited for being the first commission to: hold victim
hearings in public; individualize amnesty and allow victims fighting against and for
apartheid to testify on the same forum. All three of these innovations can be traced
back to the desire to restore the interconnectedness of a community:
because people share each others pain, the audience has as much right to be in
the presence of the testimony than the testifier;
because people who are prepared to apply for amnesty are willing to admit that
they have done wrong and could begin to change to be re-admitted into society;
because mothers who lost their loved ones, fighting for the ‘right’ or the
‘wrong’ side, suffer alike and are interconnected.
The interconnected moral self
As a white South African I am disturbed by the fact that I always notice this intercon-
nectedness as a kind of second thought. Something does not make sense and then I re-
alize that is because I think as an unattached individual. In order to learn interconnec-
tedness and live appropriately within it, I need to philosophically understand two
things: who is the community to which I am interconnected? And how is the intercon-
nected moral self formed?
The community
Prominent Xhosa intellectual, Tiyo Soga lamented in 1860 the loss of wholeness after
the entry of Christianity into Southern Africa. In his essay ‘The Believers and the Pa-
gans’ he pointed to the widening gulf between pagan and converted – the latter not al-
lowing pagans into their houses (Sanders 2002: p. 124).
Nearly a hundred years later the writer of ‘The Wrath of the Ancestors’, AC Jordan,
took this idea one step further by redefining interconnectedness in terms of African
hospitality. He said ubuntu was no longer merely what was expected of people within
a community towards members of that community, but ubuntu was what took place
between the community and strangers. For Jordan, as formulated by Mark Sanders,
hospitality and reconciliation were synonyms; it was a way of becoming, in a limited
sense, the one who was not one’s own, the one through whom one owned oneself and
became who one was. One was a person through others and became a person through
the stranger (Sanders 2002: p. 125).
Jordan warned that the figure of the stranger ought to be continually reinvented, be-
cause there would always be an outsider who ought to be remembered, or not-forgot-
ten, who called into question the existence of the collectivity. Jordan seemed to con-
clude that in terms of the African world view, it was the task of the intellectual to be
an advocate for the figure of the stranger - to insist on responsibility for the stranger as
constitutive of collectivity itself (Sanders 2002: p.129). The ‘stranger’, who threatens
the stability of the society, who puts the society at risk, also provides the possibility of
restoring and saving it (Sanders 2002: p.129; see also Gyekye 1997: p.74).
Moral self (self-in-one)
After the Holocaust, Hannah Arendt took up Socrates’s proposition: ‘It is better to suf-
fer wrong, than to do wrong’. But who decides what is wrong? The self. For Arendt
the self stands in the center of the moral consideration of human conduct (Arendt
2003: p. Xx). Even religious commands like ‘Love thy neighbour as thyself’, or
‘Don’t do unto others what you don’t want done to yourself’, couldn’t get away from
the Self (Arendt 2003: p. 68).
Arendt points out that Socrates said that it would be better for him that most men
disagree with him, than for him to contradict himself. In other words Socrates was ar-
guing with himself. He was two-within-one. Arendt re-phrased it:
Though I am one, I am two-in-one and there can be harmony or disharmony
with the self. … (but) I cannot walk away from myself … if I do wrong, I am
condemned to live together with a wrongdoer in unbearable intimacy. (Arendt
2003: p. 90)
Arendt says that the conversation with the Self was the beginning of thinking and
knowing which would make a moral entity possible (Arendt 2003: pp. 91, 95,101,112,
162).
Maybe it is at this point that an African awareness could say: I constitute the self in
another way.
Of course there is an I. Of course there should be the mind changing conversation.
But the conversation that eventually creates the moral entity is not with the self, but
with the people around one, the stranger-accommodating-community. One’s self
awareness is not formed by splitting oneself into two, but by becoming one-in-many -
dispersed as it were among those around one.
The fundamental point of departure between an African and Western worldview
could be, I suggest, in the place and the way the moral compass is formed: for Arendt
it is formed in the self through conversations with the self. For African awareness it
would be formed in the self, but through conversations with those around one.
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The departure point for Arendt lies inside the individual moving towards the self.
The departure point for African awareness also lies inside the individual, but moving
towards the community.
Arendt suggests that an individual who would like to be ‘good’, should become
completely selfless and then would embark ‘upon the most lonely career there can be
for man’ with only God as company (Arendt 2003: p.117).
According to my hypothesis of African awareness, however, it is precisely this mo-
ment of doing good towards others, which makes one belong in the world as a full hu-
man being; it is this working for others that gives one a soul. The self-er one gets, the
more self-focused, the less one’s awareness of one’s community and the more spiritu-
ally dead one becomes (Comaroff, 1991: p.143, Brown 1926: pp.137-138).
Conclusion
Why is it important to disentangle interconnectedness-towards-wholeness from the
other credited driving forces of the TRC such as Christianity, human rights, legitimiz-
ing liberation politics etc.?
Firstly, it would assist towards a more complex interpretation of the TRC process
and testimonies instead of assuming that they were mainly or exclusively informed by
Christianity and therefore usurp-able into a whole range of judgments and critique.
Secondly, it could make those ‘exporting’ the South African version of the TRC
aware of the presence of a rather decisive element in the process that, although deeply
spiritual, does not (yet) fall into one of the main religious or legal categories of the
world.
Thirdly, (some)one (like me) could start to learn how to ‘read’ interconnectedness as
the core value and bedrock of many of the actions of South Africans in different fields
and at last begin to effectively critique and value the ‘groundbreaking ways’ devel-
oped here. It is this, almost a priori, sense of interconnectedness that enabled the
South African oppressed to re-define concepts such as reconciliation and forgiveness,
even amnesty, which had become trapped in unusable religious and aggressive social
or legal contexts in many parts of the world. It means turning around Samuel Imbo’s
warning against emphasizing differences, for ‘in the dominant frameworks of Western
philosophy, ‘different’ means ‘’inferior’ (1989:139). In the case of the TRC, differ-
ence brought a creative tension that had produced productive results.
Being aware of this particular worldview also makes it possible to understand the
current groundswell of anger and frustration of victims, those very same people who
seemed to have been so forgiving during the TRC process itself, expressed in letters to
the media and group actions demanding compensation. Although their anger is used as
proof that the TRC pressurized them into forgiving, interconnectedness means that
they could well have been expecting for the perpetrators to show signs of regaining
humanity after forgiveness was extended to them. This seldom happened. Many perpe-
trators expressed surprise by a sentiment of: I want to forgive, but I do not know
whom; to them it seemed to indicate that they could continue their lives as unperturbed
as before.
Initially interconnectedness made victims forgive, but because no reciprocal sign of
change and widergutmachen came from the interconnected perpetrators, victims NOW
become angry. So fourthly, and perhaps most importantly, only by identifying inter-
connectedness-towards-wholeness as the foundation of the TRC process, would one
be able to understand that TRC resentment has more to do with thwarted beliefs now,
than with the use of Christianity to suppress anger then.
Finally, the usurpation of the TRC process into Christianity and a human rights cul-
ture obscures the fact that a radically new way, embedded in an indigenous view, had
been suggested of dealing with gross injustice and cycles of violence. This throws a
sharp light on a different way of becoming and being. Sustained scholarship into the
formation, sustainability, integrity and moral compass of interconnectedness-to-
wards-wholeness could lead to a more informed discourse around events happening on
the African continent.
References
Arendt, H. 2003. Responsibility and Judgment. New York: Schocken Books.
Bell, Richard H. 2002. Understanding African Philosophy. A cross-cultural approach
to classical and contemporary issues in Africa. New York: Routledge
Bloomfield, D., Barnes, T. and Huyse L. 2003. Reconciliation After Violent Conflict:
A Handbook. Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral As-
sistance (IDEA).
Brand, G. 2002. Speaking of a Fabulous Ghost - In search of Theological Criteria,
with special reference to the Debate on Salvation in African Christian Theology
(Contributions to Philosophical Theology Vol. 7). Frankfurt am main: Peter Lang.
Brown, J. 1926. Among the Bantu Nomads: A Record of Forty Years Spent among the
Bechuana. London: Seeley Service.
Comaroff, J. and J. 1991. Of Revelation and Revolution Volume One. Chicago and
London: The University of Chicago Press.
Derrida, J. 1997. On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness. London & New York:
Routledge.
Gobodo-Madikizela, P. 2003. A Human being died that night - a Story of Forgiveness.
Cape Town: David Philip.
Gyekye, K. 1987. An Essay on African Philosophical Thought: The Akan Conceptual
Scheme. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hewstone, M., Cairns, E., Voci, A., McLernon, F., Niens, U., & Noor, M. 2004. ‘In-
tergroup forgiveness and guilt in Northern Ireland: Social psychological dimen-
sions of ‘The Troubles’. In N.R. Branscombe & B. Doosje (Eds.), Collective guilt:
International perspectives (pp. 193-215). New York: Cambridge University Press.
http://www.princeton.edu/~uchv/whatsnew/PEPA310-2.pdf.
Hountondji, P.J. 1983. African Philosophy: Myth and Reality. London: Hutchinson
University Library for Africa.
Imbo, S. 1998. An Introduction to African Philosophy. New York:Rowman & Little-
field.
Krog, A. 1998. Country of my Skull. Johannesburg: Random House.
Mamdani, M. 1997. ‘Reconciliation without Justice’ Southern African Review of
Books, Nov/Dec 10/6.
Rapport, N. and Overing, I. 2000. Social and Cultural Anthropology – the Key Con-
cepts. London, New York: Routledge.
S. Afr. J. Philos. 2008, 27(4) 365
366 S. Afr. J. Philos. 2008, 27(4)
Sanders, M. 2002. Complicities – The Intellectual and Apartheid. Durham & London:
Duke University Press.
Serequeberhan, T. 1994. The Hermeneutics of African Philosophy – Horizon and Dis-
course. New York & London: Routledge.
Setiloane, G.M. 1976. The Image of God among the Sotho-Tswana. Rotterdam, A.A.
Balkema.
Setiloane, G.M. (no date) How the traditional World-View persists in the Christianity
of the Sotho Tswana. unpublished.
Staub, E. Pearlman, L. Gubin, A. Hagengimana, A. 2005. ‘Healing, Reconciliation,
Forgiving and the Prevention of Violence after Genocide or Mass Killing: An In-
tervention and its experimental evaluation in Rwanda.’ In Journal of Social and
Clinical Psychology, Vol. 24, No. 3, 2005, pp. 297-334.
http://www.theworld.com/~gubin/Rwandafiles/Staub,%20Pearlman,%20Gubin%20an
d%20Hagengimana.pdf
Soyinka, W. 1976. Myth, literature and the African World. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
TRC Final Report, Volume Three (1998) Cape Town: CTP Book Printers.
Van Binsbergen, W. 2001. ‘Ubuntu and the globalization of Southern African thought
and society’ Quest Vol. XV No 1-2.
Verdoolaege, A. 2007. Reconciliation discourse: the case of the Truth and Reconcilia-
tion Commission. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Wilson, R.A. 2001. The Politics of Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa - Legiti-
mizing the Post-Apartheid State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

